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In this paper I will evaluate public sector reform in Latin America, and 
particularly the two basic reforms the state apparatus historically experienced in some 
advanced countries – civil service or bureaucratic reform, in the nineteenth century, 
and managerial or new public management reform, since the last quarter of the 
twentieth century. In the first section, I will define briefly what I understand by 
political development or better governance and relate it to public management reform. 
In the second, I will show how insistent and frustrating attempts have been inLatin 
America attempts to bring about civil service reform. In the third section, the processes 
of decentralization and citizens’ participation will be briefly discussed. In the forth, I 
will shortly describe the advances in public management reform in Chile and Brazil, in 
the latter case with my direct participation and the attempt to develop a general 
theoretical framework for a reform consistent with Brazil’ social and political reality. 
In the conclusion I will mention how, through the restructuration of CLAD  (Centro 
Latinoamericano de Administración para el Desarrollo)
1
, and the realization of yearly 
CLAD international congresses, new public management finally entered the reform 
agenda of Latin American and Caribbean countries. Nevertheless, Latin American 
countries remain far away from an effective, efficient, and accountable public 
management system. 
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1. Political Development and Management Reform 
Political development may take place in any of the political ‘instances’’ that 
form the wider political system: civil society, the political regime, the state apparatus 
and its administration. A turning point in political development is the Capitalist 
Revolution which is both an economic and a political phenomenon. Except for the rare 
moments of Greek and Roman republics, one can hardly speak of political 
development before capitalism: in the economic realm it is marked by the industrial 
revolution, and the appropriation of economic surplus by a new bourgeois class within 
which business entrepreneurs engage in capital accumulation and innovation, and 
realize profits in the market; in the political realm, by the separation of the public from 
the private patrimony. In the absolute state civil society does not exist. When it 
emerges, Hegel’s ‘bourgeois civil society’, it is still weak and has little influence. In 
modern democracies, it is large and vigorous, debating in the public space, and 
forming public opinion. In institutional or political regime terms, political 
development or improved governance means the change from arbitrary rule to the rule 
of law and liberalism, and also from authoritarianism to liberal democracy. 
These are well-known political advances, which occur in the civil society and 
the institutional settings. They should, in principle, be matched by respective 
developments in the state apparatus organization, but what we see is that 
organizational and administrative changes tend to move at a slower pace than changes 
in the political and institutional level. Actually, while I have been able to detect six 
forms of political regimes since the modern national-states emerged – the absolute, the 
liberal, the liberal-democratic, the social-democratic, and the emerging social-liberal 
state – I can only discern three forms of state administration: patrimonial, bureaucratic, 
and the emerging managerial administration (or new public management). 
The transition to the liberal and constitutional state was accompanied, at the 
administrative level, by the change from patrimonial to bureaucratic public 
administration. This is civil service or bureaucratic reform, which Weber admirably 
analyzed in taking the German bureaucracy as his model. Civil service reforms took 
place in Western European countries in the mid-nineteenth century, that is, in liberal 
but not yet democratic states. Later the state became liberal-democratic, and, still later, 
social-democratic, but the state apparatus remained bureaucratic. Only in recent years 
we can observe the emergence of the social-liberal state in some developed countries, 
particularly in the ones in which bureaucratic public administration starts to adopt new 
public management. Yet, change is extremely slow, since inertia, vested interests, and 
an entrenched bureaucratic ideology represent major obstacles to public management 
or managerial reform of the state apparatus. 
It is interesting that resistance comes out of the false belief that managerial 
reform is a radical alternative to bureaucratic public administration, that it will involve  3
the abolition of the civil service, whereas, in fact, it is just a new form of managing the 
state which is to make senior civil service more autonomous and more accountable. 
While bureaucratic public administration emerged in the nineteenth century under 
liberal-authoritarian regimes to which granting the rule-of-law and the separation 
between the public and the private patrimony represented the two major challenges, 
managerial public administration rises in democratic countries, where the rule of law is 
well established and in which the challenge is to make the administration more 
efficient and more accountable to society. The major changes are in the accountability 
mechanisms. While bureaucratic public administration was controlled by strict 
procedures, auditing, and parliamentary review, in managerial public administration 
new forms of making managers abler to take decisions and more accountable gain 
force: control by outcomes, managed competition, and social control. 
Among the countries that have so far gone furthest in public management 
reform are Britain, New Zealand, Australia (see Halligan in this volume), all the 
Scandinavian countries, United States (see Christensen et al. in this volume), Brazil, 
and Chile. Italy is deeply engaged in reform, and in France and Germany some 
movement can be seen in this direction, but the administration remains essentially 
bureaucratic (see Wollmann in this volume). Although we include two Latin American 
countries in the above list, most countries in this region have not even tackled a civil 
service reform. 
It is usual to link managerial reform with ‘neo-liberal’ reforms. This only 
makes sense if neo-liberal is identified with ultra-liberal, as most people in Latin 
America do. Yet, if neo-liberal reforms just mean market oriented reforms in which 
competition and individual choice play an increased role, I have no contention with the 
term. Public management reform may be ultra-liberal, as it was in New Zealand while 
a social-democratic government was in office, and may be social-democratic, as it was 
the case of Brazil. It may be ultra-liberal in terms of stressing radical downsizing of 
the state apparatus, contracting out social and scientific services financed by the state 
with private enterprises instead of with non-profit organizations and eliminating the 
distinction between public and private managers; or it can be social-democratic in 
terms of being more concerned with a more efficient use of resources than with 
downsizing, as it contracts out social and scientific services with non profit 
organizations instead of private enterprises, as it uses social control as a major 
accountability tool, as it valorizes a small, but well paid senior civil service to perform 
the exclusive activities of state according to public ethos. 
It is usual also to link public management reform to ‘second generation 
reforms’ that would be pushed by World Bank in the developing countries, including 
Latin America. This is just mistaken information. The World Bank was indeed heavily 
committed to market oriented reforms since the Baker Plan (1985) defined these 
reforms as pre-condition for the solution of the debt crisis. It was also responsible, in  4
the early 1990s, for the making the distinction between the‘first generation of reforms’ 
(fiscal adjustment, privatization, trade liberalization), and the ‘second generation’ that 
would include state reform. Yet, the World Bank’s second generation of reforms did 
not include managerial reform. State reform meant to the World Bank – and still 
means –, first of all, downsizing; second, it means carrying out civil service reform.
2
  
Public management reform was not included, at first, in the World Bank’s 
agenda, because its bureaucracy was not sufficiently aware of it. I participated in 1996 
from an international conference on the reform of the state in Latin America; at that 
occasion  only one of the submitted papers referred to the problem – in a negative 
way.
3
 Later, in 1998, I participated in a large internal seminar of the Bank in which, 
for the first time, the Bank showed a clear interest in the subject.
4
 During the four 
years in which I was deeply involved in managerial reform in Brazil I was visited by 
World Bank people, but none showed any interest in what was going on. 
Second, the World Bank officials who in the mid-1990s had some knowledge 
of public management reform remained reserved to it.. The essential argument was 
‘sequencing’: developing countries should, first of all, have civil service reform 
completed, before engaging in public management reform.
5
 The expression 
sequencing which was employed originally by economists and political scientists to 
discuss as to whether economic liberalization should precede political liberalization or 
vice versa was extensively used by international officials in the 1990s, either to justify 
reform or to postpone it. Actually the issue is still controversial because, although 
there is certainly a point in it, sequencing can serve as a convenient excuse for 
insisting on undertaking a civil service reform before any public management reforms.  
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 I refer to 1998 World Bank's PREM (Poverty Reduction & Economic Management) annual 
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5
 Shepherd and Valencia (1996) showed their reserves in relation to managerial reform for a 
question of sequencing: Latin American countries would not be prepared to such reform. 
Almost two years later, in the 1998 PREM meeting referred above, Allen Schick, a World 
Bank’s distinguished senior official as Shepherd, maintained the same approach. He defined 
NPM as opposed to Old Public Management. What sustained OPM was a certain ethic: public 
ethic, professionalism, trust. In New Public Management we have three strands: 
managerialism (managers empowerment); contractualism (freedom to contract) out; and 
marketization (exposing public organizations to competition). Each version is more 
demanding. Developing countries will only be able to engage in less demanding version. 
Sequencing is essential.  5
The sequencing argument was not only used by international advisers, but was 
also adoped by regional bureaucracies. Take, for instance, Mexico. In the late 1990s its 
professional civil service argued that, before thinking of public management reform, 
legislation needs to be enacted formally establishing a professional civil service. The 
projected ‘civil service reform’, however, implied not much more than giving tenure to 
civil servants. This movement gained momentum in the eve of the electoral defeat of 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), as the Mexican bureaucracy, including the 
more competent officials, felt threatened and looked for more stability. It is doubtful, 
however, that legal tenure for the bureaucracy would do any good to the country or to 
its civil service.
6
 In countries where the rule of law is well established and the 
democratization process has a solid basis in society, civil service exhibits a reasonable 
stability that does not depend on law provisions. Actually, confirming what had 
happened in Brazil in its transition to democracy fifteen years before, these fears, 
again, proved unfounded. The opposition party indeed won, but the feared massive 
dismissals did not materialize. 
The Western European countries and the United States first had civil service 
reform and later managerial reform. Yet, this does not mean that the developing 
countries are supposed to follow the same steps. It often does not make sense to insist 
on first ‘completing’ civil service reform in a complex and fast changing world in 
which bureaucratic public administration has lost most of its ‘raison d’être’. It is true, 
the increased flexibility coming with new public management may be seen as a new 
opportunity for nepotism – which is civil service’s worst enemy – but, in a democracy, 
where civil service’s political control is done by the opposition parties, by the media, 
by citizen-customers, and by NGOs, managerial reform is conducive to more effective 
ways of fighting nepotism and clientelism, rather than just sticking to bureaucratic 
rules.  
For sure, adaptations are liable to be made. As Francisco Gaetani observes, 
“state reform in Latin America should be distinguished from the ones observed in the 
G-7 countries… It is not possible to take as equivalent the crisis of the welfare state 
and the populist crisis…”
7
 As we shall see, this orientation was followed in the 
Brazilian 1995 reform. The demand for entrance competitions remained a 
constitutional requirement, although the increased autonomy and accountability of 
public managers is incompatible with patrimonialist practices.
8
  
An interesting example of the almost futile efforts to reform today’s public 
administration when this is attempted without and outside a managerial reform 
framework is given by Colombia’s decentralization policy. Restrepo Botero, writing 
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on the subject, compares the 20 years old effort to decentralize to the Sisyphos myth: 
Sisyphos,  king of Corinth,  was condemned to repeatedly roll a huge stone upward a 
hill only to have it roll down again as soon as he reached the summit. The author gives 
another explanation for the continuous failure of decentralization. Decentralization 
would be part of a neo-liberal strategy. Actually, it is just a simple, unsophisticated 
way of making bureaucratic administration subtler and better adapted to demands of 
citizens. This would be fully consistent with new public management, while 
incompatible with bureaucratic public administration. 
2. Reforms after reforms in Latin America... 
For lack of reforms the Latin American states for sure will not perish… 
Governments have been constantly involved in ‘administrative reform` in the region. 
And more recently, under the pressure of United States, particularly since the 1985 
Baker Plan that officially defined the American commitment to have the indebted 
countries embark upon neo-liberal reforms as the strategy for ‘solving’ their debt 
problem, this kind of reform has been attempted everywhere on the Latin American 
continent. Yet, nor the classical administrative reforms nor the ‘second generation’ 
reforms have been of much avail. The only exception is the devolution to states and 
municipalities, but this political decentralization process was rather the outcome of the 
democratization that took place during the 1980s in the region: neither bureaucratic 
nor neo-liberal reforms, both characterized by a centralizing vein, were sympathetic to 
this type of reform. 
The literature on ‘administrative reform’ in Latin America is as huge as the 
number of attempts to make reforms in the region. Peter Spink who made a survey of 
the area observed that Latin American bureaucracies seem to be permanently engaged 
in administrative reform: “The administrative reform theme and, more recently, the 
reform of the state, has maintained a visible presence in Latin America in most of the 
last 70 years”.
9
 But in all cases studied administrative reform has meant bureaucratic 
reform. The objective was to establish in each Latin American country a civil service 
like the French, the German or at least like the American… The challenge was to 
overcome patrimonialism, to turn professional public administration. Yet, 
patrimonialism has remained strong in the region, and the attempts towards a 
professional civil service often just ended in protecting corporatist interests of the local 
bureaucracies concerned with achieving or retaining special privileges in relation to 
the respective labor markets. When competent professional bureaucracies got formed, 
as we can see in the larger Latin American countries, this bureaucracy has, however, 
little to do with the classical Weberian bureaucracy: it is much more entrepreneurial, 
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more technical, more flexible, more adjusted to the demands of state agencies and 
state-owned enterprises. 
Brazil was one of the few Latin American countries that undertook a full civil 
service reform: the 1936 DASP. Yet, it was never completed.
10
 Brazil was never able 
to have a civil service similar to the French or even to the American one. During the 
1930s the bureaucratic reform stood under influence of the American civil service 
rather than of the French, but later and just after the enactment of the 1998 
Constitution, the country tended increasingly to have as model the French 
administration and the ENA – the École Nationale d’Administration. Each new 
government attempted to ‘deepen’ the administrative reform, to turn into bureaucratic 
what hitherto was patrimonialist or just clientelist. Some successes have been 
achieved, but, by and large, the Brazilian public administration was still far from the 
bureaucratic model by 1995 when public management reforms were embarked upon. 
It is difficult to know which countries, besides Brazil, have been engaged in 
something coming close to a civil service reform in Latin America. My conclusion is 
that, although some interesting advances are taking place in Argentina, Uruguay, 
Mexico and Colombia, only Chile may be included in this category. Oszlak does not 
address this question directly, but from his analysis of the personnel selection and 
recruitment systems in the Latin American countries it is possible to deduce that, 
besides Brazil and Chile, also Argentina is experiencing public management reform.. 
He supposes four situations – (a) a generalized public competition system, (b) use of 
informal but relatively robust selection criteria, (c) personal confidence criterion as the 
dominant one, and (d) mixed system – and concludes that  “Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile are the only countries that report the generalized adoption of selection 
procedures as defined in (a). In other cases these procedures are only adopted as an 
exception, in specific jurisdictional realms like diplomacy or heath care services”.
11
 
Except for the case of Brazil where a more formal process exists, the head of the 
department has the only responsibility for recruitment and selection of the required 
personnel. Yet, although most Latin American countries have not undertaken effective 
civil service reform, Oszlak reports that “employment stability of public servants tends 
to be great”.
12
 In other words, to put it bluntly, we have the worst of the worlds – a 
perverse system of incentives: no impersonal selection through public competitions but 
extended tenure rights. 
How, then, can we explain so much talk of (and little action in) neo-liberal 
public sector reform in Latin America in the past twenty years? Public sector reforms 
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have not been just words, there have been some activities, but they have not included 
public management. These reforms were conducted by economists: local economists 
and economists from international agencies like World Bank and IMF. Most of these 
economists are bureaucrats who have little familiarity with public management and 
developed mixed feelings on the subject. On one hand, they have an idea that a 
professional civil service is something good; on the other hand, they know that the 
times of classical bureaucracy are over. Thus, they tend to leave the question aside and 
reduce public sector reform to structural adjustment, privatization, downsizing, and 
fighting corruption. 
Take two dramatic cases: Argentina and Peru, that is, two quite different 
countries that have in common only the depth of their respective foreign debt and 
fiscal crisis. Yet, there has been no real administrative reform in either country, just 
drastic reduction in state personnel, and in the case of Argentina some 
decentralization. As highlighted by Ghio and Etchemendy, in Argentina one of the 
major objectives of the Menem administration after 1989 was to undertake 
administrative reform, but eventually downsizing prevailed over more qualitative 
aspects.
13
 The same may be said of Peru. 
3. Decentralization and Participation 
Yet, there is one kind of effectively modernizing administrative reform that did 
happen in several Latin American countries: devolution or political decentralization. 
According to a World Bank’ study, “since 1983, all but one of the largest countries in 
the region have seen transfer of power, resources, and responsibilities to subnational 
units of government”.
14
 In Brazil and Argentina devolution started in the 1980s and 
was clearly an outcome of the transition to democracy that then takes place in these 
countries. In Brazil decentralization took place as a devolution of responsibilities from 
central government to the (regional) states and particularly to the municipalities. In 
Argentina, it related primarily to the provinces and especially to the area of basic 
education.
15
 Reacting to the concentration of power in central government during the 
military regimes, the underlying general idea was that the central government should 
transfer to the states/provinces and/or the local level all social services except social 
security, so that they become better adapted to and more accountable to the local 
people.  
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As an outcome of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, the share of the 
municipalities in the total tax revenues has doubled. For some time, mayors had 
difficulties in using this new money, since the states and the federal government 
continued to supply their habitually poor services. The Constitution has redefined the 
revenue shares but not the responsibilities of the different government levels. Yet 
gradually the municipalities have taken on their new social tasks. The Constitution 
originally stipulated that 25 percent of the municipalities’ expenditures should be 
earmarked for education. A 1998 constitutional amendment now requires that 60 
percent of this total be spent on basic education and prescribes the loss of federal 
grants as a penalty in case this requirement is not heeded; hence, decentralization has 
been further advanced. In Mexico one the major electoral commitments assumed by 
the Fox administration was decentralization. In Venezuela, decentralization began in 
the late 1980s, but there are indications that the attempt has largely failed. The Chavez 
administration adopted a re-centralization policy arguing that devolution had only 
benefited limited groups of the Venezuelan society. I am not able to evaluate this 
argument, but there is almost no doubt that, given the large rents coming from the oil 
industry, political elites in Venezuela have been engaged in rent seeking more than 
anything else. It seems that decentralization efforts since the late 1980s were not able 
to reverse this generalized political behavior (Briceño Reyes, 2000).
16
 
Another type of devolution – to Indian communities instead of to regions – has 
been occurring in Bolivia. In Bolivia strong resistance to decentralization was put up 
particularly by some old left groups, who associated decentralization with privatization 
and viewed both reforms as endangering national autonomy. However, the formation 
of a national-state has always been precarious in Bolivia, given the poverty of the 
country and the fact that the two great Indian nations in Bolivia, the Quechua and the 
Aymara, have never been integrated into the Bolivian state, and still today constitute 
quasi-states within the national-state. A constitutional amendment and the Law of 
Popular Participation, both in 1994, have recognized these givens and initiated a 
devolution process to the local communities: the ‘territorial organizations’, meaning 
Indian lands, have been recognized, political and administrative power has been 
devolved to municipal governments, and new forms of budget allocation have been 
defined. Besides, in each municipality  Local Committees of Economic Development 
(CODEL – Comisión de Desarrollo Económico Local) have been established which 
“are not an institutionalized organism but a space for public debate and agreement at 
municipal level”.  From these committees participate all sorts of local citizens’ 
organizations, NGOs, religious organizations, business associations, workers’ 
associations, and particularly the indigenous associations.
17
 As the main responsible 
for the reforms in Bolivia observed, this kind of ‘participatory’ devolution which 
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originally looked like an ‘impossible decentralization’ may today be viewed as a 
successful reform in Latin America, because responded to major demands.
18
 
A major macroeconomic problem following from decentralization can be a lack 
of fiscal discipline. In the 1980s central governments in Latin America finally realized 
that they had no other alternative than balancing their budgets. Yet, as devolution was 
taking place, the next problem was to curb populist spending practices at state and 
local levels. In the World Bank study above referred to, this is rightly seen as a central 
concern. Public services may be more efficient and responsive at local level, but macro 
economic problems involved should not be dismissed. After the 1988 Brazilian 
Constitution, one of the major macroeconomic problems that had to be confronted was 
the imposition of fiscal discipline on the subnational units. First the state banks had to 
be controlled, and most of them were privatized. Second, the debts of the states and of 
the large municipalities were consolidated. And, third, a Fiscal Discipline Law, 
enacted in 2000, laid down severe sanctions on governors and mayors that proved 
unable to control their accounts.  
Decentralization usually entails increased political participation, or the use of 
social control or social accountability mechanisms. When public policies are under the 
power of central government, social accountability is, by definition, precarious. In the 
moment devolution takes place, social control starts to be a possibility. 
Nuria Cunill Grau, surveying the theme in Latin America, found three models 
distinguished by its more or less formal character. While the Bolivian model giving 
power to territorial organizations would be more closed, the Mexican system, as 
expressed in the National Solidarity Program, would be in an intermediary situation, 
and the Colombian ‘veedurías ciudadanas’ would be the least formally 
institutionalized and more open one to participation of all types or citizens’ 
organizations. Yet, she observed that either formalization or lack of it is a good 
criterion to evaluate social control. To start, it is required to have citizens and a state 
that recognize them as such. Thus, “independently of the formalization of the social 
control models, whenever the state decides institutionalize social control the 
effectiveness of the policy will depend on the effectiveness of state itself: by 
definition, if the state is fragile, social control will also be so”. Consequently, Cunill 
Grau concludes that the conditions for effective social control are just beginning to 
exist in Latin America.
19
 
In fact, decentralization and social control depend on the existence of citizen 
rights, to begin with the right to full disclosure of information on public agencies. In 
other words, it depends on the existence of the rule of law, and, more broadly, on the 
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advance of democracy. Democracy is no substitute for decentralization and social 
control, but the later are outcomes of the democratization process, and, at the same 
time, they are factors making for better democratic governance. The advance of 
democratization, the transition from the first stage of democracy, when free elections 
already exist but elites continue to concentrate almost all power to more advanced 
forms of democracy, depends essentially on an increased public debate, and on varied 
forms of social control that begin from the local level and are fueled by devolution. In 
the 1970s and the 1980s, one of the key figures in the long process of transition to 
democracy in Brazil, André Franco Montoro – a politician and a law professor – 
distinguished himself not only by the democratic principles he promoted, but also by 
always tying democracy to devolution and participation. Yet, evaluating the 
decentralization process in Latin America, Iván Finot came to the conclusion that 




3. Managerial Reform 
Decentralization and social accountability are part of managerial reform, but 
should be distinguished from it. Managerial reform or public management reform 
involves more than devolution: involves also decentralization within each sphere of 
government. On the other hand, social control is just one of the three new forms of 
making officials accountable (the other two are control by management contracts and 
outcomes, and managed competition). While civil service reform is concentrated in 
procedural control and parliamentary review, public management reform emphasizes 
these three additional accountability tools..  
Given this definition, I believe that, in Latin America, only in Chile and in 
Brazil we can see the beginnings of public management reform. 
Chile 
The economic and political transformations that took place in Chile were not 
accompanied by similar changes in the way of managing the state apparatus. Since 
1982 Chile does not face a critical or unmanageable situation that makes necessary the 
adoption of drastic measures. Furthermore, it does not face any of the problems that 
usually go with the state reform processes, such as fiscal crisis, widespread corruption, 
evident inefficiencies or serious questioning about the appropriate size or scope of the 
state. Despite these trends, Marcel (1997) points out that the recent administrative 
reform in Chile is designed to address its most serious problems. In particular, civil 
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society are placing new demands on public institutions, and the state is trying to 
respond with a reform agenda that uses its available resources most effectively.  
According to Marcel, the process of state modernization in Chile, which 
implementation started in 1993, already under democratic rule, was developed around 
three axes. First, a new organizational culture emerged and was concentrated on 
results, in contrast with the traditional focus on procedures. Second, the adoption of a 
strategy of gradual and cumulative change sought to produce long-term changes in 
public institutions. Third, reform effort remained within the direct control of the 
executive branch: central administration and executive agencies.  
Yet, the initiative that makes me include Chile among the countries that started 
public management reform, was the incorporation of a system of performance 
indicators and targets in the budgetary provisions. This innovation started in 1994, and 
after three years of application managed to reach approximately 70 state agencies and 
300 indicators.  
A pilot program, launched in 1993, was conceived with the notion that, despite 
bureaucratic rules, public agencies were flexible enough to undertake public 
management initiatives and capable of defining their own functions and goals. The 
core of the program was the development of strategic planning exercises. With the 
participation of directors, staff members, and clients these exercises attempted to 
achieve a clear identification of the organizational mission, the objectives, the services 
to be delivered, and the main clients. After this analysis, specific management projects 
should be developed and a managerial information system. These projects, in turn, 
would establish specific management targets and commitments and permit internal and 
external review. Targets and commitments could then be turned into performance 
agreements or management contracts which would consider incentives and awards for 
good management. This program was applied initially in five public agencies and later 
extended to five other agencies within the Ministry of Finance, all having being 
completed in 1995. 
The experience of the pilot program inspired a more comprehensive program 
that consolidated a managerial perspective on state reform. In this sense, public 
management reform was viewed as a gradual process: feasible, partial initiatives were 
implemented without big legal changes. Moreover, incentives, demands and guidelines 
on institutional managers would play a central role in the administrative reform. In line 
with this reform agenda, the new government under President Eduardo Frey 
established an Inter-Ministerial Committee, made up of the Ministries of the Interior 
and of Finance, and the General Secretariat of the Presidency. Its fundamental purpose 
would be the promotion, coordination and planning of initiatives to be implemented in 
public agencies. In mid-1994, the first initiative developed by the Committee was the 
signing of ‘modernization commitments’ between 43 public bodies and the central 
government, represented by President Frey. These commitments, proposed by the  13
bodies themselves, covered a variety of fields and presented various levels of 
complexity. The evaluation of these commitments at the start of 1995 showed that they 
reached close to 80% in the agreed targets. 
Nonetheless, the Dirección de Presupuestos of the Ministry of Finance 
concluded that the gradualist and sequential focus adopted by the Pilot Program was 
too slow to produce a significant effect on the entire public administration. It decided 
to promote a more aggressive agenda, concentrating on the generation of performance 
indicators in order to integrate them into the budgetary process. During the preparation 
of the budget, in the second half of 1994, some leading agencies were requested to 
identify performance indicators and targets for the year of 1995. Twenty-six public 
bodies responded to this request and 107 performance indicators were selected for 
them. This information was incorporated into the 1995 budget act and was favorably 
received by the National Congress and by the press. This system was extended in the 
following year: it reached 67 institutions with 291 indicators in 1996. 
The new Lagos administration (2000) maintained the program involving 
strategic planning and control by outcomes through the national budget, but centered 
its attention on a ‘complete institutional redesign of the state organization’. On the 
other hand, a civil service reform, creating a professional civil service and defining 
bureaucratic careers, became a major objective. Thus we had a return to the principles 




The Brazilian 1995 Managerial Reform 
The 1995 public management reform was the second major administrative 
reform in Brazil. There had been tree prior administrative reforms, but the second and 
especially the third one were soon reversed. The first, beginning in 1936, was the 
bureaucratic reform that established a professional civil service and the principles of 
bureaucratic public administration. The second, established by the military regime 
through the Decree-Law nº 200 (1967), was the developmental reform – a kind of 
pioneering public management reform –, which was discontinued in 1988, with the 
return to democracy. The third, embodied in the 1988 Constitution, was a counter-
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Public management reform started in 1995, with the Plano Diretor da Reforma 
do Aparelho do Estado (White Paper on the Reform of the State Apparatus), and with 
the executive branch submitting to Congress a constitutional amendment to the chapter 
on public administration of the 1988 Constitution. I was personally involved in the 
reform between January 1995 and December 1998, as head of the Ministry of Federal 
Administration and Reform of the State (MARE), in the first Cardoso administration. 
Implementation of the reform continues, now under the new Ministry of Management 




It is important to distinguish public management reform defined in the Plano 
Diretor from the constitutional amendment that came to be called ‘administrative 
reform’. The constitutional amendment played an important part of public 
management reform, because, besides allowing for the reform, roused a national 
debate that changed traditional views of public administration.  
Managerial public administration was introduced as representing a superior 
stage to bureaucratic public administration. Historically we had, first, patrimonial 
administration of the state; then bureaucratic public administration; and finally, 
managerial public administration. To make public managers more autonomous means 
to make them more efficient, given the complexity of the problems modern 
governments face in a fast changing world. To make them more accountable means to 
develop new forms of strategic planning and of control. The objective is that the state 
– and more broadly, society – used the limited available resources in a better and more 
efficient way, and also in a more democratic way. Thus, besides giving importance to 
classical forms of political accountability (procedural rules, auditing, and 
parliamentary review) the reform proposes three managerial accountability forms: 
control by contracted outcomes, by managed competition, and by social control. 
Previous to the reform, a complete diagnosis of the state of the Brazilian public 
administration at that moment was undertaken. In the constitutional amendment the 
basic idea was to make more flexible the existing full tenure system for civil servants, 
and to eliminate the single law regime for hiring personnel for the state. The basic 
objective was not to eliminate personnel redundancies – although this was also a 
legitimate objective – but to make public management more efficient and more 
accountable. Or, in other words, to valorize competent professionals.
24
 
Many of the institutional changes, however, did not require formal 
constitutional amendments. When the three basic organizational institutions of the 
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reform, ‘regulatory agencies’, ‘executive agencies’ and ‘social organizations’ (hybrid 
institutions between state and society that execute social services), were formally 
created, it was not necessary to change the constitution. Other important changes in 
public administration did not involve constitutional reform: an effective remuneration 
policy for civil servants; yearly recruitment and selection of new officials for the “state 
careers”;
25
 and elimination of undue privileges statutory civil servants had acquired in 
the law that had established the “single public labor regime” (a requirement of the 
1988 Constitution that the 1998 managerial amendment terminated). 
In a critical study of the 1995 Managerial Reform, Celina Souza e Inaiá de 
Carvalho correctly observed that, although the reform emphasized decentralization, it 
did not sufficiently recognize the regional complexities involved in implementation.
26
 
Indeed, devolution was a political and administrative process that preceded managerial 
reform and had its own autonomy, so that, given the limited powers assigned to 
MARE, I thought it more realistic not to deal further in the process than I already had.. 
In this small ministry my team and I were more concerned with a broad and long range 
state reform, trying to define the role of the state, distinguishing the exclusive 
activities of the state – that should remain within the state apparatus – from social and 
scientific services – that should be contracted out with non-profit (or public non-state, 
as I preferred to call) organizations –, and from the production of goods and services 
for the market, which should be privately owned. Moreover, I was concerned with 
administrative decentralization within the federal government, making public 
managers more autonomous and more accountable, through the creation of executive 
and regulatory agencies, and the transformation of social and scientific services in 
‘social organizations”. Finally, our objective in MARE was to improve public 
services’ efficiency and quality, orienting actions to the citizen-client instead of being 
self-referred, as usually happens in bureaucratic public administration.  
As a political economist, since 1987 I have been diagnosing the Brazilian (and 
the Latin American) crisis not only as a foreign debt crisis, but also as a fiscal crisis of 
the state. Thus, the 1995 Managerial Reform, instead of being seen as an exogenous 
constraint imposed by globalization, was rather viewed as consequence of the 
endogenous crisis of the state. Globalization should not be dismissed, but the emphasis 
was rather on the crisis of the Latin American developmentalist state. Moreover, the 
proposed reform was directly related to my insistent critique of the two opposite 
ideologies that have been dominating the Brazilian scene for long: on one hand, the 
old developmentalist and statist ideas, on the other, the conservative ultra-liberal credo 
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sponsored by conservatives of all kinds, often with the support of the international 
organizations in Washington.
27
 These are false alternatives, ignoring that they do not 
apply to the reality in developed countries, and that an intermediary developing 
country like Brazil is also able to find its own way between these two extremes. 
The 1995 Managerial Reform adopted a managerial approach to public 
management and a social-democratic and social-liberal approach to the role of the 
state. The reform is managerial because it draws inspiration from the management of 
private companies, and because it adopts the promotion of public agencies’ autonomy 
and accountability as its basic strategy to achieve more efficiency and quality. It is 
democratic because it presupposes democratic governance, makes social control by 
civil society a major form of political accountability, and requires transparency from 
public agencies. It is social-democratic because it asserts the state’s role of 
guaranteeing the effective protection of social rights. It is social-liberal because it 
believes in the market as an excellent but imperfect resource-allocating agent, and 
views contracting out services and managed competition as excellent accountability 
tools. Although it reasserts the state’s duty to protect the weak – the poor, the children, 
single mothers, the elderly – it does not aim to be paternalistic. It does not 
underestimate his or her capacity to work to defend his or her own rights of 
citizenship, so long as the state offers the right incentives and opportunities.
28
 
The reform was not in the agenda of the country, nor in the manifesto of the 
political coalition that won the 1994 elections. When the new ideas began to be 
exposed to public opinion, in January 1995, opposition was, at first, wide-spread. But 
as public debate continued, backing was bit by bit achieved. Eventually it gained broad 
support in public opinion and among senior civil servants. Finally, against all initial 
prospects, Congress approved the constitutional amendment in 1998.
29
  
In the beginning of 1998, realizing that the constitutional amendment was 
finally being approved by Congress, I concluded that the implementation of the reform 
could not and should not be undertaken by a small ministry like MARE, short of 
executive power. Considering the Chilean experience of using the administrative 
power existing in the Ministry of Planning and the Budget Office, I proposed that the 
implementation of the reform should be responsibility of a new Ministry of Planning, 
Budget and Management (that would emerge from MARE’s merger with the Ministry 
of Planning and Budget). The proposal coincided with other views in the 
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administration, and was adopted by President Cardoso in his second term, starting in 
1999. 
Since this date the reform is being gradually implemented, under the 
responsibility of the new ministry and of the Secretary of Management. Instead of 
being called ‘Managerial Reform’, a new and similar name was adopted: 
‘Entrepreneurial Management”. Advances are happening, not only at the federal, but 
also at the state and municipal levels, since the 1995 reform has changed the agenda all 
over the country. Transformations usually evolve gradually which makes some believe 
that the reforms have foundered. In fact, they have not failed. Major administrative 
reforms have a critical moment of institutional and cultural change, and a long and 
uncertain process of implementation.
30
 What is important is to know whether the new 
views have been accepted and become dominant in society and among senior civil 
servants – and I have no doubt that they have. 
4. Conclusion 
I conclude this review of public management reform in Latin America with a 
reference to CLAD – the Latin American Centre for Development Administration. 
This is a small multilateral Iberoamerican organization formed by 25 member 
countries, with headquarters in Caracas. I was his president from 1995 to the end of 
1997, and, since then, president of its Scientific Council.
31
 In this period I was able to 
change the organization mission so that it became a major forum of debates for public 
management reform in the region. Since 1996 CLAD is organizing major yearly 
congresses, with a support from BID, the Bank of Interamerican Development and 
other international organisms.
32
 During three days hundreds of papers were discussed 
in around one hundred panels. In the 1998 Congress, in Spain, the ministers of public 
administration of the member countries signed the Madrid Declaration, “A New Public 
Management for Latin America”. Prepared by CLAD’s Scientific Council, this 
document, which is available in CLAD’s web site, represents a major change in the 
Latin American views on administrative reform: it ceased to be viewed as civil service 
reform and started to be understood as public management reform. 
                                              
30
 On the effective advances of the 1995 managerial reform, see Bresser-Pereira (2000) and 
Nassuno (2000). 
31
 CLAD’s Scientific Council is formed by Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, Nuria Cunill Grau, 
Adam Przeworski, Joan Prats y Català, Leonardo Garnier and Oscar Oszlak.  
32
 In 1995 BID’s president, Enrique Iglesias, was one of the first person to give full support to 
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Public management reform is just beginning in Latin America. An active civil 
society, where public debate plays a major role in shaping public opinion, and 
institutional reform, particularly public management reform, are two strategic factors 
in promoting economic development in the region. This will happen in the moment 
that the density of the public space, the quality of public management institutions, and 
the professionalism of civil servants prove to be better than the one that the level of 
income per capita would lead us to predict. For the moment, in spite of some advances 
made, we cannot say that much was achieved. For sure, civil society advances, and a 
Weberian civil service ceased to be an ideal. Instead, more flexible labor contracts, and 
professional and competent but more autonomous and accountable public officials are 
now required. On the other hand, neither the developmentalist state nor the ultra-
liberal minimum state make any sense. The statist model of development got 
exhausted, but the ultra-liberal alternative proposed (or imposed) by the rich countries 
did not show the promised results. The region badly need better governance, better 
political and administrative institutions, that will enable their governments to find their 
own ways of promoting economic development and reducing blatant social injustice: 
public management reform adapted to Latin American circumstances certainly have a 
role to play in this area. 
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